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March / April 2001
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Compliance Audits Can Protect Plan Sponsors
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By Sheldon M. Geller, Geller Group Ltd
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Plan sponsors should periodically conduct self-audits to detect and correct plan
defects before the Internal Revenue Service or Department of Labor finds the
defect and fines the plan.
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A self-audit is a review of plan documents and operations that is used to
determine the level of compliance and to find and correct any qualification
failures under the Internal Revenue Code as well as fiduciary violations under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.
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In addition to its self-correction programs, the Internal Revenue service has
issued a digest of approved correction methods for 206 different violations.
The Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Labor have dramatically deferred
to plan sponsors by permitting them to correct violations through
self-correction mechanisms to avoid significant monetary sanctions and
fiduciary liability. The IRS has demonstrated a high degree of faith that plan
sponsors and practitioners have a strong interest in ensuring that their plans
remain qualified and will apply IRS guidelines for self-correction.
IRS programs encourage plan sponsors to conduct self-audits and to develop
self-audit practices within the framework of their existing plan procedures. It
has become increasingly common for qualified plan sponsors to periodically
engage in self-audits to detect and correct plan defects before the government
becomes involved.CORRECTION PROGRAMS
The IRS and the DOL have established a comprehensive system of correction
programs for plan sponsors to ensure that plans are operated in accordance with the tax
qualification requirements of the Internal Revenue Code and the fiduciary
responsibility provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).1 These programs permit plan sponsors2 to correct qualification failures
and violations of Title I of ERISA and therefore continue to provide their
eligible employees with retirement benefits on a tax favored basis without
penalties.
Monetary sanctions and penalty taxes of substantial amounts may be imposed by the IRS
and DOL even if the failures are unintentional administrative errors that
result in no harm to plan participants.3 The IRS emphasized that sanctions will
be imposed for failure to follow the terms of the governing plan document even
if plan operation otherwise complies with the qualification requirements of the
Code.4
SELF-CORRECTION PROCEDURES
A plan sponsor that has conducted a self-audit and has established a self-correction
procedure may correct operational failures within a specified time period to
avoid IRS fees and sanctions and ERISA fiduciary liability.5 A plan sponsor that
has established compliance practices and procedures may, at any time, correct
insignificant operational failures without paying any fee or sanction.
Furthermore, if a qualified plan is the subject of a favorable IRS
determination letter, the plan sponsor generally may correct even significant
operational failures within a two-year period without paying any fee or
sanction.
SELF-AUDITS
The IRS and DOL correction programs promote voluntary compliance, encourage plan
sponsors to conduct self-audits and require the establishment of internal
control procedures. A self-audit is a review of plan documents and operations
that is used to determine the level of compliance and for the purpose of
finding and correcting any qualification failures under the Code and any
fiduciary violations of ERISA.
The self-audit is distinguished from the financial audit that is required under
ERISA for larger plans.6 The financial audit must be performed by an independent
qualified public accountant and reviews the plan's financial statements as
reported on IRS Form 5500 in accordance with standards established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. On the other hand, a
self-audit may be performed by the plan sponsor, ERISA fiduciaries, attorneys,
accountants, plan consultants or other service providers.
The correction of a qualification failure identified during an IRS audit and
corrected with IRS approval may result in a significant monetary sanction.
Further, if a fiduciary breach is voluntarily corrected, plan fiduciaries may
avoid paying the 20 percent civil penalty7 that would have applied if the
correction had been made due to DOL enforcement efforts.8
Plan fiduciaries who breach their fiduciary duties may be held personally liable to
restore any losses to the plan that occur as a result of their breaches.
ERISA's fiduciary provisions are riot premised on nomenclature or official
appointment, but rather fiduciary status is determined by functional terms of
control and authority over plan officers and employees of the plan sponsor.
Further, members of the board of directors and trustees who are fiduciaries may
be held liable as co-fiduciaries.9
Whereas, the correction of a qualification failure or document defect identified during
a self-audit eliminates the employer's uncertainty regarding their potential
tax liability and civil penalty, self-audits are encouraged by IRS and DOL10 and
raise a number of important issues including the purpose and scope of the
audit, types of plan defects, confidentiality, payment of the audit fee with
plan assets and professional liability.
SAFEGUARDING TAX BENEFITS
Retirement and 401(k) plans must comply with an array of legal requirements under the
Internal Revenue Code to qualify for tax-exempt status.11 Plan sponsors are
required to establish and maintain an up-to-date, legally compliant written
plan document that is communicated to employees and describes the specific terms
and benefits provided under the plan.12 Failure to maintain compliance with the
qualification requirements may ultimately lead to the revocation of a plan's
qualified status, including the loss of tax benefits.
A recently issued report reviewed 1,802 retirement and 401 (k) plans with
qualification failures during 1999, and advised that (i) 42 percent experienced
plan document failures, (ii) 66 percent experienced operational failures and
(iii) all types and sizes of plans were represented among those plans with
qualification failures.13
The report also determined that plan sponsors were assessed monetary sanctions that
were 10 times greater on a field audit than the compliance fees that could have
been assessed if the failures had been corrected as a result of a self-audit.14
Further, the IRS imposed higher compliance fees for plan document failures,
particularly failures involving contribution and benefit provisions.15
ERISA FIDUCIARIES
Fiduciary responsibility under ERISA continues to evolve as federal courts interpret and
apply the statutory language. A named fiduciary is the single most important
fiduciary in administering a plan and the individual or entity most concerned
with plan compliance. The act of appointing a named fiduciary is itself a fiduciary
function. Accordingly, an employer's board of directors who generally designate
the named fiduciary, either through its procedure set forth in plan documents
or by approving the plan document that designates the named fiduciary, is an
ERISA fiduciary of the plan with respect to the appointment process.
Furthermore, members of the board of directors and officers of the corporation sponsoring
the plan are ERISA fiduciaries to the extent that they perform fiduciary
functions in selecting and retaining plan service providers.
PLAN DEFECTS
A qualification failure is any failure that adversely affects the qualification
and thus the tax-favored treatment of a plan. There are three types of
qualification failures:
- plan document failures,
- operational failures and
- demographic failures.
A plan
document failure is a plan provision that violates the qualification
requirements of the Code. For example, the failure of a plan to be timely
amended to reflect the Code's then-existing qualification requirements.
An
operational failure arises from the failure to follow the terms of the plan
document, unless the plan may be amended (under an applicable remedial
amendment) retroactively to conform to actual plan operation. For example, a
failure to return excess 401(k) deferrals; follow the plan's definition of
eligibility, entry dates, vesting or compensation; and the miscalculation of
the plan's contribution provision, benefit formula or distributable amounts.
A
demographic failure is a failure to satisfy the general non-discrimination,16
minimum participation,17 or general coverage requirements18 of the Code (that is
not an operational failure). The correction of a demographic failure generally
requires a plan amendment adding more benefits or increasing existing benefits.
If a
plan contains disqualifying provisions or it is not timely amended to comply
with new legislation or does not reflect actual plan operation and the remedial
amendment period has expired, then the plan sponsor may not self-correct to
avoid IRS sanctions and fiduciary liability. That is, the operational
violations cannot be corrected by a plan amendment because the defect becomes a
form (i.e., document) violation. Accordingly, it is imperative that plan
sponsors conduct self-audits to identify and correct plan defects before the
expiration of the remedial amendment period.
There
are no limitations on the number of years a plan sponsor may use the
self-correction procedure. A self-audit establishes records that fully
demonstrate how violations occurred, when they are discovered, what steps were
taken to effectuate correction, and when correction was completed. If there is
a subsequent IRS examination, the plan sponsor will have to establish that
correction was proper and timely.19
PURPOSE
Although
most plan documents are drafted and timely amended to comply with applicable
law, plan sponsors rarely, if ever, audit actual plan operation for conformity
with actual plan terms. Attorneys, accountants and other professional advisors
seldom conduct operational audits to ensure compliance. The IRS will impose
sanctions for a plan sponsor's failure to follow plan terms even if plan
operation otherwise complies with the qualification requirements of the Code.
The
issues an IRS auditor identifies under examination20 rarely constitute
intentional or egregious violations of the qualification requirements of the
Code. Most violations appear to occur in the administration of qualified plans
and may be identified during self-audit. A plan sponsor may then correct an
operational failure (even if significant) if the correction is completed (or
substantially completed) by the last day of the second plan year following the
plan year in which the failure occurred.
Further,
a plan sponsor may correct violations of the general non-discrimination,
minimum participation and general coverage requirements by the 15th day of the
10th month after the close of the plan year in which any of these violations
occurred by covering more lower paid employees or providing more benefits to
lower paid employees. However, a plan is not eligible for self-correction if it
has no administrative procedures designed and in place to ensure operational
compliance.
Self-audits
permit correction that is in the control of the plan sponsor and its agents
(i.e., lawyer and accountant) and before correction requires the participation
of parties not within the control of the plan sponsor (i.e., plan participants,
spouses and beneficiaries). Plan sponsors need to conduct annual self-audits to
immediately effect the correction of operational violations to avoid the
involvement of other parties. It may take substantial time to complete the
correction process if the process requires participation by parties not within
the plan sponsor's control.
Accordingly,
reasonable plan sponsors and ERISA fiduciaries are advised to conduct
self-audits on an annual basis to ensure plan document and operational
compliance to avoid IRS sanctions and fiduciary liability. Further, plan
sponsors are advised to conduct compliance self-audits prior to the submission
of an application to the IRS to effect a plan termination or if the plan
sponsor has partial termination concerns.
PRACTITIONER
RESPONSIBILITY
Given
the complexity of the pension and tax laws, it is relatively easy for a
business sponsor to inadvertently administer its plan in a manner that would
constitute a qualification failure.
Nevertheless,
once the practitioner advising the plan is aware of an apparent qualification
failure, the practitioner is responsible for providing the plan sponsor with
advice on correcting the failure.21 A practitioner's advice needs to identify (i)
possible corrective action, (ii) fees charged by IRS for approval and (iii)
audit sanctions that could be assessed by the IRS if the plan sponsor does not
either submit the corrections to the IRS for approval or self-correct the
failures.
It is,
without qualification, in the best interests of plan sponsors and their
practitioners to conduct periodic internal audits to ensure compliance; and if
failures are discovered, for practitioners to advise as to the nature and
extent of the failure or failures, and for plan sponsors to immediately correct
those failures.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Although
the IRS encourages voluntary compliance and believes that most plan sponsors
attempt to administer their plans properly, the IRS understands that there will
always be plan sponsors willing to play audit roulette. Nevertheless, each key
district office of the IRS weighs whether the operational failures are insignificant
and considers as an adverse factor the failure to correct a known violation
prior to an audit. Plan sponsors are responsible for making their own initial
determination whether there are operational violations. Further, any plan
self-corrected may still be subject to later audit.
Accordingly,
it is advisable to have competent ERISA legal counsel conduct a self-audit to
preserve a claim of attorney-client privilege or attorney work product.
Nevertheless, plan fiduciaries generally may not claim a privilege between
themselves and the participants
and beneficiaries under the plan.22 Further, there is no privilege if the
attorney represents the plan. Accordingly. legal counsel should represent only
the plan sponsor and not the plan regarding certain issues. because no
privilege exists regarding communications between attorneys who are retained by
a plan and the plan fiduciaries who retain those attorneys on behalf of the
plan. If the attorney is paid by the plan. then the attorney represents the plan.
not the plan sponsor.
Voluntary
disclosures of otherwise confidential communications may waive the privilege
(e.g.. if plan sponsor representatives discuss the results of a self-audit with
those who are not directly involved with the self-audit process).
If
self-audits are documented. the documents may be discoverable by the DOL under
ERISA Title I if the agency is investigating fiduciary breaches in the context
of plan administration. Therefore, legal counsel should perform the compliance
audit and prepare documentation to preserve a claim of attorney-client
privilege or attorney work product, particularly because self-audit
documentation will likely include the admission of an error or a qualifying
plan defect.
Accordingly,
it is advisable for plan sponsors to retain ERISA counsel to identify and
correct through a self-audit process prior to an IRS audit. The self-audit is
an alternative to plan disqualification.23 Disqualification may result in the
imposition of monetary sanctions, litigation and misrepresentations to
third-parties (i.e.. plan auditors, lenders, buyers). Plan sponsors may detect
and self correct insignificant deviations and significant qualification
failures within a specified time period without reporting the corrections to
the IRS for approval, without having IRS supervision, and without paying a
compliance fee or sanction.24
The IRS
expects that self-audits will be confidential.25 Employee plan specialists have
been instructed not to request copies of a plan sponsor's compliance reports. Nevertheless,
plan sponsors may use self-audit documentation defensively to demonstrate
compliance. Plan sponsors need to properly structure the self-audit process to
be protected by the attorney-client privilege.26
To
maintain the privilege, fiduciaries who anticipate a lawsuit should take care
to identify separately all their written attorney client communications
relating to the matters in issue as prepared in anticipation of litigation.
Once the interests of the fiduciary and the beneficiaries appear to diverge,
ERISA fiduciaries and their counsel may have privileged communications in
anticipation of litigation against ERISA plan fiduciaries.
Because
plan participants and beneficiaries are entitled to plan administration
correspondence, advice relating to potential lawsuits should be strictly
segregated from advice concerning general plan administration. Indeed, separate
counsel for litigation issues may be necessary to preserve the privilege.
Furthermore, communications are privileged regarding advice concerning an
employer's non-fiduciary decisions such as whether to amend or terminate a
plan. ERISA's fiduciary duties and the federal common law interpreting these
duties have become major factors in plan governance.
FINANCIAL
AUDITS
A
self-audit compliance process enables the employer to make the required
representations regarding plan compliance to the plan's auditors in connection
with the annual financial audit for certain larger plans. Employers need to
represent that:
- the
plan document satisfies ERISA and IRS qualification requirements,
- the
plan is being operated in accordance with the plan document and IRS
qualification requirements, and
- the
plan has not engaged in a "prohibited transaction" with a "party
in interest."27
A
prohibited transaction is a per se violation of ERISA subjecting the employer
to a 15 percent annual excise tax, an additional 100 percent excise tax, and
lawsuits by the DOL and plan participants. ERISA defines party in interest to
generally include, among others, plan sponsors and anyone providing services to
a plan.
PLAN
TERMS
Plan
documents need to be timely amended to comply with legislative changes and need
to conform to actual plan operation. Thus, if loans were made to participants,
but the plan document did not permit participant loans, the plan sponsor would
need to correct this operational failure. The failure may be corrected by a
plan amendment that conforms the terms
of the plan to the plan's prior operations. For example, if the 401 (k) plan
failed the AD p test and the employer made qualified non-elective contributions
to avoid a return of excess 401 (k) deferrals to highly compensated employees,
the plan may be amended to reflect operational correction.
MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS
An
employer involved in a merger or an acquisition needs to make representations
on employee benefit plan compliance. These representations are made to the
effect that plan documentation satisfies ERISA and IRS qualification
requirements and that the plan is being operated in accordance with the plan
document and IRS qualification requirements.
If a
company is sold or is intended to be merged with another company, failure to
comply with applicable plan documentation requirements may nullify the
traditional employee benefits-related representations in the acquisition or
merger agreement, creating liability for the plan sponsor. In this event, the
plan sponsor may either have to qualify his or her representations, disclose
non-compliance or take the risk of incurring additional liability for breaching
one or more of the representations it makes in connection with the corporate
transaction.
It is
difficult to conduct an operational review and correct document and operational
failures prior to the closing of a transaction. Accordingly, self -audits
facilitate mergers and acquisitions and protect plan sponsors in connection
with representations regarding plan documentation and actual plan operation.
The
compliance audit also enables a plan sponsor to identify and disclose document
defects or operational failures and either negotiate 401 (k) and retirement
issues or insure the related risks posed by the failures.
SERVICE
PROVIDERS
Some
service providers to a plan are "parties in interest," including
accountants who audit the assets of a plan, attorneys who provide legal and
fiduciary counseling for the plan, and banks that hold plan assets.
Accountants, attorneys, banks and other service providers who are parties in
interest that participate in a fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duties under
ERISA or a prohibited transaction may be subject to liability under ERISA.
The
U.S. Supreme Court has determined that a non-fiduciary party in interest may be
held liable under ERISA for participating in a prohibited transaction.28 This
recent ruling, while holding non-fiduciary parties in interest potentially
liable for their involvement in prohibited transactions under ERISA, may have
also established the possibility for non-fiduciary liability of entities that
are not parties in interest.29 Accordingly, it appears that any individual or
entity who is a knowing participant in a fiduciary breach, whether or not they
are parties in interest, would be subject to liability under ERISA.
Accordingly,
any entity providing services to a qualified plan will need to analyze
transactions for potential liability exposure as well as consider the need for
increased liability insurance.
Service
providers need to protect themselves when dealing with qualified plans through
liability insurance and hold-harmless agreements. There is now increased
liability exposure for plan service providers because plaintiffs seeking to
hold a party to a plan transaction liable for a fiduciary's breach need only
show that the party had knowledge of the breach. Even individuals or entities
that do not pay fair value to a plan or that overcharge a plan for services
rendered may be held liable as a result of this U.S. Supreme Court case ruling.
ACCOUNTANTS
AND ATTORNEYS
In
another matter, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review of a case asking the court
to decide whether ERISA's party in interest provisions completely preempt
claims for state statutory violations of professional conduct brought against a
pension plan's non-fiduciary.30 A trustee and participant in a qualified plan brought
an action in state court against a law firm, alleging that the firm overcharged
the plan for legal services rendered between 1986 and 1988. Accordingly, the
appellate ruling remained in effect holding that state law claims alleging the
charging of excessive legal fees is precisely the type of prohibited
transaction governed by ERISA. The court held that the law firm was not a
fiduciary under ERISA and was not subject to a cause of action for a breach of
fiduciary duties; therefore, the appellate court focused on the issue of
non-fiduciary liability.
Nevertheless,
an accountant or attorney service provider may become a fiduciary if he or she
engages in a fiduciary activity including, but not limited to, appointing other
plan fiduciaries, delegating responsibility to or allocating duties among other
plan fiduciaries, selecting and monitoring plan investment vehicles, giving
investment advice to a plan for a fee, selecting and monitoring third-party
service providers, negotiating the compensation of third-party service
providers, interpreting plan provisions and denying or approving benefit
claims.
An
attorney or accountant who renders legal or accounting services to a plan
fiduciary will not be considered a fiduciary unless he or she exercises
discretionary authority or discretionary control over plan management or the
disposition of plan assets, or has any discretionary authority over plan
administration.31
Further,
a fiduciary cannot comply with his or her duties under ERISA without a basic
understanding of the fee structure for various services provided to the plan.
The DOL, through the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration (PWBA),
enforces the provisions of Title I of ERISA and may conduct a service provider
investigation.32 A significant portion of PWBA resources are directed at
investigating plan service providers, with particular review of fee
arrangements and the possibility of a prohibited transaction.
Fees
paid by a plan for the services provided by accountants and attorneys may
violate ERISA's prohibited transaction rules. Since an entity or an individual
who provides services to a plan is an ERISA party in interest, the fees are
considered a transfer of property from the plan to a party in interest.33
ERISA
allows only fees that (i) are "reasonable" in amount and (ii) have
been paid for services that are "necessary for the establishment of the
plan."34 If the fees do not satisfy either of these requirements, the
service provider may be required to return the fee to the plan and may be
subject to an IRS excise tax -the results of having entered into a prohibited
transaction under ERISA.
An
annual compliance audit is a cost-effective method for accountants and
attorneys to avoid potential fiduciary breaches, prohibited transactions, and
the financial consequences of non-compliance. Lack of clearly established plan
documentation, including eligibility requirements, and actual plan operation
consistent therewith, could result in successful benefit claims by
participants, part-time employees and independent contractors, who are not
intended to benefit under the plan. Given the complexity of ERISA's rules,
accountants may need ERISA legal advice to help them avoid the risk of
potential fiduciary breaches and prohibited transactions. An accountant may also
consider procuring fiduciary insurance to cover negligent breaches of fiduciary
duty. Accountants and attorneys need to avoid certain types of transactions and
obtain plan sponsor assurances of operational compliance.
DISCRETIONARY
AUTHORITY
The
lack of unambiguous plan language as well as provisions granting the plan
administrator the discretionary authority to interpret plan provisions and to
construe plan terms relating to eligibility and other salient provisions, may
subject the plan administrator as well as its professional advisors to the
increased possibility of a successful claim against the plan. Ambiguous
language and the lack of plan administrator discretion may subject the
decisions of the plan administrator to de novo (i.e., full factual) review by a
court, should the decisions of the plan administrator (i.e., plan sponsor) be
challenged by a dissatisfied participant or former employee.
PLAN
DOCUMENTATION
The
failure to include provisions authorizing affiliated employers to adopt the plan
may also result in inadvertent state corporate law or other applicable law
violations. Furthermore, a well drafted summary plan description and a review
of an employer's employee handbook or other employee communication material may
be binding upon the employer by a court of law, even if inconsistent with the
governing plan document. Professional advisors need to make certain that
employers maintain an up-to-date and fully executed written plan document to
avoid:
- substantial penalties,
- vulnerability to successful claims and challenges,
- a
constraint upon the employer's ability to modify the plan,
and
- issues in a proposed merger or other corporate transaction.
FIDUCIARY
STANDARDS
A
fiduciary is required to diversify the investments of the plan so as to
minimize the risk of large losses (unless under the circumstances it is clearly
prudent not to do so).35 Thus, ERISA adopts the portfolio theory of investment,
and the standard of prudence applies to each investment as a part of the total
portfolio.36 The self-audit should include a review of the composition of the
plan portfolio with regard to the diversification of risk and the adherence to
specific investment guidelines of the plan.
QDRO
PROCEDURES
Written
plan documentation includes the maintenance of qualified domestic relations
order (QDRO) procedures to permit plan administrators to administer the
submission of a QDRO. Although there has been a longstanding requirement to
have a QDRO procedure in place, there has been no record of sanctions against a
plan administrator for failing to provide a procedure. Nevertheless, the DOL is
increasing its enforcement actions against plan administrators, which may now
include the review of QDRO procedures. Most attorneys are not familiar with the
Code or ERISA and the requirements to qualify a domestic relations order for a
transfer of plan assets from a qualified plan, without jeopardizing the
tax-exempt status associated therewith. As a result, the domestic relations
orders submitted to plan administrators by counsel are generally deficient and
not in conformity with the Code's requirements for QDROs.
Plan
administrators are receiving a significantly increasing number of domestic
relations orders, which require a review as to the qualifying nature thereof,
and then the timely processing of the order. Plan administrators need to avoid
a delay in any benefit payments to participants or alternate payees under a
QDRO, to avoid additional claims by beneficiaries of the QDRO.
A DOL
Advisory Opinion has made it clear that plans may not charge a fee to
individual plan participants to process a QDRO.37 The opinion does not however
prohibit charging the costs of administering the review of a domestic relations
order to the trust as a general administration expense. This expense would
therefore be spread among all plan participants, rather than the participant
directly affected by the QDRO.
LIABILITY
INSURANCE
Insurance
carriers favorably consider compliance audits when underwriting the risk and
thus determining the premium payable for fiduciary liability insurance.
Fiduciary liability insurance has provided coverage for operational failures
and ERISA violations committed by plan sponsors.
A 401
(k) plan sponsor was indemnified for failing to inform employees when they
switched guaranteed income contract carriers and misled participants by
continuing to use the old carrier's enrollment forms. A plan sponsor was also
indemnified for releasing a spouse's retirement funds to the participant in the
absence of spousal consent.
A 401
(k) plan sponsor and its investment committee were indemnified and defense
costs paid for imprudently investing plan assets ill an Insurance carriers
guaranteed income contract because of the carrier's extensive bond holdings. A
pension plan sponsor was indemnified for taking more than 45 days and thus
failing to timely value plan assets in response to an employee's request in
writing for a pension calculation. There was a substantial drop in the stock
market that adversely affected the value of the employee's retirement funds.
A
pension plan sponsor was indemnified and its defense costs paid for failing to
account for maternity leave in determining service for pension benefits.38
In
addition to fiduciary liability coverage, a plan sponsor may qualify for an
insurance program providing indemnification against IRS monetary sanctions.
These sanctions are not covered by traditional fiduciary liability policies.
401 (k)
and retirement plan trustees need to consider all of the relevant factors and
circumstances and their responsibilities as fiduciaries in determining whether
to use plan assets to pay for fiduciary liability coverage.39 To this end, ERISA
expressly allows, but does not require, a plan to purchase insurance for its
fiduciaries or for itself to cover liability or losses occurring by reason of
the act or omission of a fiduciary, provided that such insurance permits
recourse by the insurer against the fiduciary in the case of a breach of a
fiduciary obligation under ERISA by the fiduciary.40
Accordingly,
plan trustees need to consider whether and to what extent the purchase of
insurance with plan assets is primarily for the benefit of the plan, the ERISA
fiduciaries in their official capacities, the ERISA fiduciaries in their
personal capacities or the employer, by taking into account all relevant facts
and circumstances and the particular responsibilities of the fiduciaries. ERISA
's exclusive benefit rule requires that ERISA fiduciaries need to act prudently
and solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries when using plan
assets to pay expenses.41
AUDIT
FEE
Plan
audits are not inexpensive, and may be paid by the plan or the plan sponsor.
The DOL has approved payment of a self-audit with plan assets provided the
following requirements are met:42
- the
plan document permits the use of plan assets to pay for the compliance audit,
- the
plan fiduciaries determine that a compliance audit is a prudent means of
operating the plan,
- the
amount paid for the audit is reasonable (taking into account the benefit
received by the plan as well as by the plan sponsor), and
- any
amounts paid may not include the payment of sanctions or penalties for
non-compliance.
Accordingly, plan sponsors would not
violate the fiduciary provisions of ERISA if they used plan assets to pay for
compliance audits. The compliance audit can include, but is not limited to, an
examination of the administrative aspects of a plan's routine operation,
including the plan's collection of contributions, payment of benefits and
investment of assets, as well as compliance with the qualification provisions
of the Code. The compliance audit generally relates solely to the management of
a tax qualified plan and to decisions relating to the establishment, design or
termination thereof.
It is
the DOL's view that reasonable expenses of administering a plan include direct
expenses properly and actually incurred in the performance of a fiduciary's
duties to the plan. Thus, if the plan trustees were to determine that periodic
compliance audits were a helpful and prudent means of carrying out their
fiduciary duties, including the duty to operate the plan in accordance with its
terms,43 then the use of plan assets to procure compliance audit services would
not, in and of itself, violate ERISA.44
In
choosing among potential service providers, as well as the monitoring and
retention of a service provider, the trustees must objectively review the
qualifications of the service provider, the quality of the work product and the
reasonableness of the fees charged in light of the services provided. This is
an important trustee function to the extent that compliance audits may confer a
benefit on the employer; therefore, trustees have a duty to ensure that the
plan's payment for the compliance audit is reasonable in light of the benefits
conferred on the plan.
Moreover,
to the extent that the compliance audit involves services for which a plan
sponsor or other entity could reasonably be expected to bear the cost of in the
normal course of the entity's business, the use of plan assets to make such
payments would not be a reasonable expense of administering the plan.45
If a plan
disqualifying defect was not caused by a breach of fiduciary duty, the plan may
only pay for any resulting sanctions and penalties to the extent that such
payment would constitute a reasonable expense of the plan.46
The DOL
has expressed its view that ERISA fiduciaries may not use plan assets for the
payment of sanctions or penalties in connection with the settlement of disqualification
matters with the IRS. These penalties do not constitute a reasonable expense of
administering the plan for the purpose of ERISA, to the extent that there is
personal liability for someone or some entity other than the plan.47
401 (K)
PLAN REPORT
The IRS
examined and compiled data on 472 401 (k) plans from 1995 through 1997 and has
issued a report advising of the results of its 401 (k) audit program.48 The
primary purpose of the survey was to identify areas in which 401 (k) plans
failed to comply with the Code and to obtain information on the sizes of the
plans containing these violations. These violations were not limited to
qualification requirements, but also included prohibited transactions, deemed
distributions and reporting failures.
The IRS
conducted this 401 (k) audit program to assist plan sponsors, employers and
practitioners who have an interest in maintaining the tax qualified status of
their own 401 (k) plans by identifying where violations are more likely to
occur. The IRS reported that there were many violations relating to eligible
rollover distributions, special non-discrimination tests, and compliance
testing.
401 (k)
plans may not make any other benefits contingent on the employee making
deferrals. There were many violations by plan sponsors who made 401 (k) plan
participation contingent upon the employee meeting non-plan specific
conditions. Many plans also violated the hardship distribution criteria, the
top heavy requirements and the limitation on annual additions.
Plan
sponsors had entered into prohibited transactions by failing to timely deposit
401 (k) salary deferrals from the employer's payroll and operating account into
the 401 (k) plan's trust. Although the maximum period has been reduced to the
1Sth business day following the month of the deferral, the general rule is and
has been that the funds must be segregated from the general assets of the
employer as soon as reasonably practicable.
Partnership
plan sponsors permitted partners to elect in and out of profit sharing features
and thus caused their profit sharing features to be treated as 401 (k)
features. A plan that allows partners to elect in and out of a non-401 (k)
feature will have violated the Code by not including the proper 401 (k) plan
language in the profit sharing feature, as well as exceeding the annual
$10,500, as indexed, limit on 401 (k) elective deferrals. That is, if profit
sharing contribution allocations to partners are treated as 401(k) deferrals,
the annual dollar limitation on 401(k) deferrals will likely have been exceeded
under the plan.
The
survey is useful in identifying areas to be reviewed in a self-audit. We
understand that the IRS has again targeted 401 (k) plans in its 2001 work plan
in an effort to gain greater insight into the areas of non-compliance.
IRS-APPROVED
CORRECTIONS
A digest of IRS-approved corrections of Code violations has been prepared to
include 206 different violations under 81 retirement plans through April 2000.49
In one case, the IRS cited a plan sponsor for violating the definition of
compensation in calculating 401 (k) deferrals and employer matching
contributions. The IRS permitted the plan sponsor to retroactively amend the
plan to adjust the definition of compensation to exclude taxable special
allowances and imposed a monetary sanction of $50,000.
The IRS
cited another plan sponsor for administering a plan in accordance with a
three-year cliff vesting schedule, whereas the plan document had a four-year
graded vesting schedule. The employer drafted, but failed to execute, the
amendments to effect the three-year cliff vesting schedule. The IRS permitted
the plan sponsor to retroactively amend the plan to provide for a three-year
cliff vesting schedule and imposed a monetary sanction of $50,000.
The IRS
cited another plan sponsor for permitting participation as of the date of hire,
rather than on an entry date following satisfaction of an age and service
requirement set forth in the plan document. The IRS permitted the plan sponsor
to execute a retroactive amendment to allow immediate participation and imposed
a monetary sanction of $50,000.
- AUDIT ENGAGEMENT
The plan sponsor and legal counsel need to determine:
- whether the compliance audit will follow a traditional accountancy model and
thus examine randomly selected transactions to determine compliance or a
screening method to review documents and interview key personnel,
- the cost of the audit and who pays for the audit and
- whether the audit report is reduced to writing, including any discovered
defects, and the resolution of those defects, as prepared by legal counsel. If
an individual other than legal counsel performs the compliance audit, then only
an oral report of plan defects and the correction thereof should be made to
plan trustees.
The results of a compliance audit need to be transmitted to the trustees of the
trust established as a part of the qualified plan. The engagement letter for
the self-audit process may include a disclaimer that a self-audit cannot
guarantee that all issues will be found or that additional defects will not
later be discovered by the IRS or DOL upon examination. Further, the engagement
letter may include a statement that the auditor is relying on the plan
administrator (i.e., plan sponsor representative) to provide the data necessary
to conduct the audit and that the results of the audit depend on the accuracy
of the data provided.
Further, the auditor may negotiate a hold-harmless agreement if Title I of ERISA or
other litigation results and the auditor is required to testify as a defendant.50
BEST PRACTICES
Employee benefit plan advisors who want to correct qualification failures and ERISA
violations pursuant to established IRS and DOL policies and programs may want
to conduct annual self-audits. However, voluntary compliance is a relatively
new and rapidly changing area of the law.
Even the most carefully administered plan may experience a potentially disqualifying
defect that may be timely discovered by the implementation of self-correction
procedures and the conduct of an annual self-audit. The sanctions associated
with disqualification disproportionately penalize the plan sponsor for
inadvertent and unintended infractions of the very complex rules under the Code
and ERISA. Plan sponsors should rely on the availability of self-correction to
maintain the qualified status of their plans and to avoid fiduciary liability.
NOTES
1. Rev. Proc.2000-16, I.R.B.2000-6 (2/7/00) (updated and consolidated me various programs that comprise the Employee Plan Compliance Resolutions System and superceded Rev. Proc. 98-22, 99-13 and 9931); See also DOL Notice, 65 Fed. Reg. 14163, Mar. 15, 2000 (program for voluntarily correcting violations of Tide I of ERISA called me Voluntary Fiduciary Correction Program) and DOL Proc., 60 Fed. Reg. 20874, Apr. 27, 1995 (program for delinquent filers of Form 5500 called the Delinquent Filer Voluntary Compliance Program); See also 64 Fed. Reg. 22589,Apr. 27,1999
(PBGC issued a proposed rule on self-correction of premium underpayments).
2. Ibid (the term "Plan Sponsor" means the employer mat establishes a qualified retirement plan for its employees).
3. See Moore, Journal of Compensation and Benefits, March April 2000.
4. Ibid (the IRS has already concluded more man 5,000 correction program audits and has imposed significant monetary sanctions for failure to comply operationally
with me Code's qualification requirements).
5. See Treas. Reg.. §1.401(a)(4)-11(g) (the IRS correction procedure is modeled after the corrections mechanisms for certain conforming, retroactive plan amendments).
6. See Newman, 2000 Quick Reference to ERISA Compliance (panel Publishers 2000).
7. ERISA §502(l).
8. ERISA §§409, 501 (a).
9. See District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1468, 1484
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Freund v. Marshall & Isley Bank,485 E Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
10. IRS Memorandum (Feb. 20,1999); See also BNA Daily Tax Report, Feb.12, 1999, G-7.
11. See I.R.C. §401(a) (specifies qualification requirements for pension, profit sharing, 401(k) and stock bonus plans).
12. Treas. Reg. §1.401-1(a)(2).
13. United States Government Accounting Office Report on IRS Programs for Resolving Deviations from Tax-Exemption Requirements (Aug. 14, 2000).
14. United States Government Accounting Office Report on IRS Programs for Resolving Deviations from Tax-Exemption Requirements (Aug. 14, 2000).
15. United States Government Accounting Office Report on IRS Programs for Resolving |
Deviations from Tax-Exemption
Requirements (Aug. 14, 2000).
16. I.R.C. §401(a)(4).
17.I.R.C. §401(a)(26).
18. I.R.C. §410(b).
19. United States Government Accounting Office Report on IRS Programs for Resolving Deviations from Tax-Exemption Requirements (Aug.14, 2000) (in commenting on a draft of the Government Accounting Office Report, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue generally agreed that the report fairly and accurately described the correction of qualification failures and emphasized that plan sponsors may detect and correct insignificant and certain significant deviations without IRS involvement (see Letter from Charles 0. Rosotti to Cornelia M. Ash by, July 21, 2000).
20. Ibid (the term "under examination" means, among other things, a plan that is (i) under an Employee Plans examination of Form 5500, (ii) pending a termination filing under Form 5310 and (iii) the subject of a notification by an Employee Plans agent to the plan sponsor that there are partial termination concerns).
21. CCH/IRS interview, CCH Pension Plan Guide Sec. 41,0042 and 17,201N (2000).
22. Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. Washington Star Co., 543 F. Supp. 906 (D.D.C.1982).
23. IRS Memorandum (Dec. 23, 1996) (modified and restated by Rev. Proc. 98-22).
24. United States Government Accounting Office Report on IRS Programs for Resolving Deviations from Tax Exemption Requirements (Aug. 14, 2000).
25. See IRS Memorandum (Feb.20,1999).
26. See Deering, "Plan Audits and Attorney Client Privilege," ALI-ABA Course of Study, Pension, Profit Sharing, Welfare and Other Compensation Plans )Mar. 20-22, 1996).
27. See ERISA §406.
28. Harris Trust Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238 (2000).
29. BNA Pension and Benefits Report June 20, 2000).
30. BNA Pension and Benefits Report (Nov. 21, 2000); See Rutledge v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 208 F.3d 1170, cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 482 (2000).
31. See Geller and Mamorsky, Journal of Compensation and Benefits, July I August 2000; See 29 CFR §2509.75-5, D-l. |
32. PBWA ERISA Enforcement Strategy Implementation
Plan.
33. See BNA Pension and Benefits Report June 20, 2000).
34. See DOL Advisory Opinion No.97 -03A Jan. 23, 1997).
35. ERISA §404(a)(1)(C).
36. See BNA Pension and Benefits Report (Oct. 24, 1994).
37. DOL Advisory Opinion No. 94-32A (Aug. 4,1994).
38. ERISA §403(c)(1); See www.chubb.com business.
39.ERISA §404(a)(1)(D).
40. See Letter from Susan G. Lahny to Gary Henderson July 28,1998).
41. ERISA Sec. 410(b)(1); See DOL Advisory Opinion No.76-03 (March 17, 1976).
42. See DOL Advisory Opinion No. 97-03A Oan.23,1997).
43. See ERISA §§403, 404 (in this regard, DOL has acknowledged that fiduciaries may rely on information, statistics or analysis furnished by persons performing ministerial functions for the plan, provided they have
exercised prudence in their selection and retention of such persons); See 29 C.F.R. §2509.75-8
(Q-11).
44. See DOL Advisory Opinion 97-03A (May 23, 1997).
45. Letter to David Alter and Mark Hess from Betty Briggs (Sept.10, 1996); See also Letter to Kirk E Maldonado from Elliot I. Daniels (March 7, 1987).
46. See Letter to Herbert New from Ivan Strasfield (Aug. 4, 1998) (plan fiduciaries must act freely and solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries when causing the plan to purchase insurance).
47. See Letter to Mark Sokolsky from John J. Canary (Feb. 23, 1996) (penalties under I.R.C. §6652 imposed upon a plan
administrator or other plan sponsor representative is a personal liability that may not be satisfied with plan
assets).
48. See www.irs.gov/bus-info/ep/401k.hgml.
49.BNA Pension and Benefits Report June
13, 2000).
50. See Blum, "Self-Audit: Initial Considerations:' ALI-ABA Course of Study Pension, Profit Sharing, Welfare and Other Compensation Plans (Sept.19, 1995). |
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